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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an interlocutory appeal from a discovery order 
entered by the Honorable Frank G. Noel, Third Judicial District 
Court of Tooele County. The district court ruled that a letter 
dated June 11, 1985 was privileged and need not be produced. 
This Court granted petitioner Gold Standard, Inc. (hereafter 
"Gold Standard") permission to appeal the district court's order 
pursuant to Rule 5, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
The respondents on appeal are as follows: American 
Barrick Resources Corporation, Barrick Resources (USA) Inc., 
Texaco, Inc., Getty Oil Company and Getty Mining Company (hereaf-
ter "Barrick/Getty"). For the purposes of this appeal, the term 
"Barrick" shall refer to the two Barrick entities and the term 
"Getty" shall refer to the two Getty entities. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issue that Gold Standard presents in its opening 
brief is premised on factual mischaracterizations that are not 
supported by the record. Simply stated, the proper issue on 
appeal is: 
Did the district court abuse its discre-
tion when it determined that the June 11, 
1985 letter, which is in the nature of a 
retainer agreement and contains confidential 
communications, is protected by the attorney-
client and work product privileges? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-24-8 Privileged Communications. 
There are particular relations in which it is the pol-
icy of the law to encourage confidence and to preserve it 
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inviolate. Therefore, 
in the following cases: 
a person cannot be examined as a witness 
* * * 
(2) An attorney cannot, without 
consent of his client, be examined as to 
communication made by the client to him, 
his advice given therein, in th£ course 
professional employment; nor can 
attorney1s secretary, stenographe: 
the 
any 
or 
of 
an 
or clerk 
be examined, without the consent of his 
employer, concerning any fact, the knowledge 
of which has been acquired in such capacity. 
Rule 26(b)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Trial preparation: Materiali. Subject 
to the provisions of Subdivision (b)(4) of 
this rule, a party may obtain discovery of 
documents and tangible things otherwise dis-
coverable under Subdivision (b)(1) of this 
rule and prepared in anticipation of litiga-
tion or for trial by or for another party or 
by or for that other party's representative 
(including his attorney, consultant, surety, 
indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a 
showing that the party seeking discovery has 
substantial need of the materials in the 
preparation of his case and that he is unable 
without undue hardship to obtain the substan-
tial equivalent of the materials by other 
means. In ordering discovery of such materi-
als when the required showing has been made, 
the court shall protect against disclosure of 
the mental impressions, conclusions, opin-
ions, or legal theories of an attorney or 
other representative of a party concerning 
the litigation. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE 
In December, 1986, Gold Standard filed a lawsuit 
against various entities including, but not limited to the par-
ties to this appeal. Since that time, a missive amount of dis-
covery has taken place including the production of over one hun-
dred thousand pages of documents by Barrick/Getty. There are 170 
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volumes of deposition testimony and the district court has 
resolved numerous discovery motions during the past three years. 
On May 10, 1989, Gold Standard filed its motion to com-
pel production of the particular document that is the subject of 
this appeal, a June 11, 1985 letter addressed to Parsons, Behle & 
Latimer and signed in counterparts by Texaco, Inc., Getty Oil 
Company, Getty Mining Company, Getty Gold Mine Company, Barrick 
Petroleum (USA) Inc. and Barrick Resources Corporation (hereafter 
"June 11 letter"). In the memorandum in support of its motion, 
Gold Standard argued that the document contains terms regarding 
the sale of Getty's interest in the Mercur Mine to Barrick and, 
therefore, is not protected by either the attorney-client or the 
work product privileges. Record at 4283. 
In its memorandum in opposition to plaintiff's motion 
to compel, Barrick argued that the document was protected by the 
attorney-client privilege and work product immunity and that Gold 
Standard had failed to demonstrate both that it had substantial 
need of the materials in the preparation of its case and that it 
was unable, without undue hardship, to obtain the substantial 
equivalent of the materials by other means. Both criteria are 
required by the exception to work product protection contained in 
Rule 26(b)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Barrick submitted 
the June 11 letter to the district court for jLn camera review. 
Barrick also submitted an Affidavit of Patrick J. Garver, 
Barrick1s counsel, in support of its position that the document 
was prepared in anticipation of litigation, contained 
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confidential communications concerning legal advice, and that the 
parties who signed the document formulated steps to ensure that 
the document remained confidential. Record at 4322 (copy 
included in Appendix as Item "1"). Getty and Texaco also filed a 
pleading in opposition to Gold Standard's motion to compel. 
Record at 4346. 
After an iji camera review of the document and consider-
ation of both the legal memoranda filed by the parties and the 
oral arguments of counsel, Judge Frank G. Noel entered a minute 
entry on July 28, 1989 stating that, ff[t]he Court is of the opin-
ion that the agreement of June 11, 1985 is privileged and there-
fore denies [plaintiff's] motion to compel.11 Record at 4754 
(copy included in Appendix as Item "2"), The order denying 
plaintiff's motion to compel and making the sealed copy of the 
document a part of the record on appeal was entered on August 14, 
1989. Record at 4937 (copy included in Appendix as Item "3"). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court has broad power to determine whether 
a document is privileged. Its finding will be overturned only if 
it is clearly erroneous. After an in camera review of the docu-
ment, the district court correctly ruled that the June 11 letter 
is privileged. Although the document is in the nature of a 
retainer agreement, its terms go beyond that type of agreement. 
The June 11 letter contains confidential communications that are 
protected from discovery by the attorney-client privilege. In 
addition, the document was prepared in anticipation of litigation 
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and contains legal observations and conclusions. Therefore, it 
is work product, as well. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
in the more than three years that this case has been 
proceeding toward trial, the district court has presided over and 
managed discovery while hearing and ruling on several substantive 
motions, in the process, the court has acquired a working knowl-
edge of the complex facts and procedural background of this case. 
A lower court's finding should be overturned only if clearly 
erroneous. E.g., United States v. Wilson, 798 F.2d 509 (1st Cir. 
1986). 
ARGUMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The inquiry that is required to resolve the issue on 
appeal imposes constraints on both parties. Barrick/Getty is 
unable to discuss the June 11 letter in detail without disclosing 
its contents and possibly waiving the privileges afforded to the 
document. Understandably, Gold Standard must speculate as to the 
document's contents because Gold Standard has never seen it. As 
is common in this type of matter, and as occurred at the district 
court level, Barrick has submitted the June 11 letter to this 
Court for in camera inspection in connection with the present 
appeal. See Parker v. Kitzhaber, No. 88-1089-JU (D. Or. June 8, 
1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. File) (district court ordered 
party to submit retainer agreements under seal for jji camera 
review) (copy included in Appendix as Item "4"). 
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In an attempt to balance effective advocacy and the 
risk of waiver, Barrick/Getty will discuss the nature of the doc-
ument without discussing its specific contents. The June 11 let-
ter cannot readily be classified or categorized. It contains 
elements of a retainer agreement, but its terms go beyond those 
of a standard retainer agreement. As the cpurt will discern from 
its in camera inspection, the document contains communications 
that are privileged, as well as, observations and conclusions 
that are work product. The June 11 letter also contains one 
paragraph that might possibly be characterized as "transac-
tional," but that paragraph is not directed at effectuating the 
June 1985 sale of the Mercur Mine, as Gold Standard speculates, 
but rather, is conditional and focuses on future events. More 
importantly, the paragraph is inextricably bound up with the 
attorney-client relationship. 
Gold Standard speculates that the agreement may contain 
indemnity terms. It does not. Gold Standard argues that the 
document is at the heart of the questions of title, property 
rights, breach of fiduciary and contractual obligations, and con-
spiracy. It is not. 
II. THE DOCUMENT IS PROTECTED FROM DISCOVERY BY 
THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE ANt> THE WORK 
PRODUCT DOCTRINE. 
A. The Attorney-Client Privilege Promotes Broad Pub-
lic Interests. 
It is well settled that the attorney-client privilege 
provides protection from disclosure of confidential communica-
tions that are made between client and lawyer in the course of 
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providing legal advice of any kind to the client. See, e.g., J. 
Wigmore, 8 Wiqmore on Evidence S 2292, p. 554 (McNaughton rev. 
ed. 1961). The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the 
privileges for confidential communications known to the common 
law. Its purpose is to encourage full and frank communication 
between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader 
public interests in the observance of law and administration of 
justice. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). 
B. The Work Product Doctrine Is Well Recognized Under 
Utah Law And Protects Materials Prepared In Antic-
ipation Of Litigation. 
The work product doctrine protects material prepared in 
anticipation of litigation from compelled disclosure. The doc-
trine was first recognized in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 
(1947), and has been codified and broadened in Utah by Rule 
26(b)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule states in per-
tinent part: 
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents 
and tangible things otherwise discoverable 
under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and 
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for 
trial by or for another party or by or for 
that party's representative (including his 
attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, 
insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that 
the party seeking discovery has substantial 
need of the materials in the preparation of 
his case and that he is unable without undue 
hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent 
or the materials by other means. 
(Emphas i s added.) 
Documents are protected by the work product doctrine if 
they have been prepared by or for a party or by or for that 
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party's representative in anticipation of litigation. See Rule 
26(b)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; City Consumer Services, 
Inc. v. Home, 100 F.R.D. 740, 747 (D. Utah 1983). The rationale 
for the doctrine is that it is unfair to allow parties to avail 
themselves of an opposing lawyer's work product. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit has held that, "litigation need not necessarily be imminent 
. . . as long as the primary motivating purpose behind the cre-
ation of the document was to aid in possible future litigation." 
United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1040 (5th Cir. 1981), 
cert, denied, 454 U.S. 862 (1981); Osterneck v. E.T. Barwick 
Industries, Inc. , 82 F.R.D. 81, 87 (N.D. Ga. 1979) citing 8 C. 
Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2024, at 
p. 198 (1970). From a review of the document itself it is appar-
ent that the June 11 letter was prepared in anticipation of this 
very litigation. 
C. The Document Fulfills The Requirements For Protec-
tion Pursuant To Both The Attorney-Client Privi-
lege And The Work Product Doctrine. 
1. The document contains confidential communica-
tions that are protected by the 
attorney-client privileg^. 
As stated above, the terms of the document go beyond 
those of a retainer agreement. The June 11 letter sets forth the 
substance of confidential discussions between clients and counsel 
relating to legal advice. Record at 4322. As the Court will see 
from its jji camera inspection, the document contains confidential 
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communications that are protected by the attorney-client 
privilege. 
2. The document was prepared in anticipation of 
litigation and is protected by the work prod-
uct doctrine. 
The record demonstrates that the June 11 letter was 
prepared in anticipation of litigation with the involvement of 
counsel for Barrick/Getty. Record at 4322. Additionally, Gold 
Standard makes no claim that Barrick/Getty did not anticipate 
litigation at the time the document was created. As the Court 
will see from its jji camera review, the letter contains observa-
tions and conclusions, was prepared in anticipation of this very 
litigation and, is therefore, protected from discovery. 
D. When Confidential Communications Are Contained In 
A Retainer Agreement They Are Protected From 
Discovery. 
Barrick does not quarrel with Gold Standard's position 
that the external trappings of the attorney-client relationship, 
such as the existence of the relationship, the fees paid and the 
basic terms of the attorney's employment, are not protected from 
discovery. That argument does not apply to the June 11 letter, 
however, because the terms of the letter go beyond the basic 
facts of the attorney-client relationship. Indeed, the document 
contains privileged confidential communications. 
Confidential communications within retainer agreements 
are protected by the courts pursuant to the attorney-client priv-
ilege. See Parker v. Kitzhaber, No. 88-1089-JU (D. Or. June 8, 
1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file); Cf. United States v. 
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Liebman, 742 F.2d 807 (3rd Cir. 1984) (a substantial confidential 
communication was privileged when the communication was disclosed 
during the act of retaining a lawyer); In re Securities 
Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 595f 603 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (rejecting a 
claim of attorney-client privilege because request did not seek 
confidential matters); J. Gergacz, Attorney-Corporate Client 
Privilege, at 3-35 (1987) (disclosure of factual circumstances of 
attorney-client relationship may be privileged if they reveal or 
threaten to reveal the substance of attorneys-client confidences). 
In the recent case of Parker v. Kitzhaber, the 
plaintiff sought a copy of all retainer agreements between a law 
firm and its client. The United States District Court for the 
District of Oregon ruled that the attorney-client privilege did 
not apply to the names, addresses, telephone numbers and dates of 
contacts with client representatives, pointing out that the 
attorney-client privilege does not cover issues related to the 
creation or existence of the attorney-client relationship (which 
are not at issue here). However, the court noted that the 
documents may contain confidential communications that are 
covered by the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 2 (copy 
included in Appendix as Item "4"). 
During Robert McConnell's deposition, Gold Standard 
itself argued this position and refused to disclose the terms of 
its own engagement of counsel on the grounds of the 
attorney-client privilege. See Deposition of Robert McConnell, 
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p. 336 (a copy of the relevant page is included in Appendix as 
Item "5"). 
The document contains confidential communications that 
are privileged and concern legal advice. Record at 4320. As the 
above discussion points out, privileged confidential communica-
tions are protected regardless of whether they are contained in a 
retainer agreement. The confidential communications in the 
June 11 letter are protected from discovery by the attorney-cli-
ent privilege. 
E. The Document Is Not An Arms-Length Commercial 
Agreement, Rather, It Is A Joint Communication To 
Counsel For The Parties Relating To Potential Lit-
igation. 
In its brief, Gold Standard argues that the respondents 
could not have a legally protectable expectation of confidential-
ity in executing an agreement that was part of an arms-length 
commercial transaction. Opening brief at 10. The June 11 letter 
is not directed at effectuating the June 1985 sale of the company 
that owned the Mercur Mine. Rather, the document is conditional 
and focuses on contingencies in the event of litigation which was 
threatened by Gold Standard. 
Additionally, the signators to the document were made 
aware that the document was to be treated as privileged and kept 
confidential. Record at 4322. An _in camera review of the docu-
ment will disclose provisions that were formulated to help pre-
serve the document's confidentiality. Indeed, Gold Standard 
cites no evidence of waiver in the voluminous record below. In 
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fact, there is none. The privileges attached to the document 
have been protected. 
F. The Document Was Addressed To Counsel And Was Cre-
ated With Counsel's Assistance, Not Merely w Fun-
nel edw To Counsel, Making Jackson v. Kennecott 
Inapplicable To This Case. 
In the opening paragraph of its brief, Gold Standard 
argues that the Utah Supreme Court previously decided the issue 
raised by this appeal in Jackson v. Kennecott Copper Corp.f 495 
P.2d 1254 (Utah 1972). Gold Standard cites Jackson for the prop-
osition that when presented with the question of whether particu-
lar documents were privileged, this Court "rejected a claim of 
privilege and protection because the [doctuments were] merely 
'funneled1 to counsel." Opening brief at p. 9. In this case, 
the document was not "funneled" to a lawyer who had no hand in 
the creation of the document, as occurred in Jackson. Rather, 
the June 11 letter is a communication addressed to counsel and 
counsel for the signators was involved in its preparation. 
Record at 4322. 
Unlike Jackson, in which the documents sought were 
highly factual and contained mostly raw data, this case involves 
a letter to counsel that contains confidential communications 
between counsel and client. The document contains virtually no 
factual information. Moreover, in Jackson, tfie defendant did not 
anticipate specific litigation, whereas, in this case, the par-
ties to the document were aware of both Gold Standard's identity 
and the specific claims that Gold Standard might bring. That 
awareness became a reality in December, 1986 when Gold Standard 
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filed this lawsuit against the parties to the document. Record 
at 36, 
In Jackson, Kennecott's counsel was not involved in the 
actual drafting of the documents, but merely had requested that a 
series of potentially damaging documents, containing factual 
data, be forwarded to him. In contrast, counsel for the 
signators of the June 11 letter was involved in the drafting of 
the document, which contains the substance of discussions relat-
ing to legal advice. Record at 4322. Jackson does not apply to 
the instant facts and therefore, does not resolve any of the 
issues raised by this appeal. 
III. THE JUNE 11 LETTER WAS NOT DIRECTED AT THE 
JUNE 1985 SALE OF THE GETTY GOLD MINE COMPANY 
BUT AT CONTINGENCIES THAT MIGHT RESULT FROM 
FUTURE LITIGATION. 
Throughout its brief, Gold Standard's recurring theme 
is that Barrick has somehow admitted that the document is "part 
and parcel" of the sale of the Mercur Mine. As a matter of fact, 
Barrick has never made such an admission. Out of an abundance of 
caution, Gordon Roberts, counsel for Barrick, stated at a deposi-
tion that the June 11 letter "may come within the purview of that 
[question]" when a witness was asked whether the Stock Purchase 
Agreement reflected the entire agreement between Barrick and 
Texaco with respect to the acquisition of the Mercur Mine. See 
Deposition of Stephen Dattels, p. 301 (a copy of the relevant 
page is included in Appendix as Item "6"). Mr. Roberts then 
agreed to, and did furnish the foundational basis for Gold Stan-
dard to bring the motion to compel before the district court. 
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As stated earlier, the document is primarily a retainer 
agreement. The June 11 letter was not directed at effectuating 
the June 1985 sale of the company that Owned the Mercur Mine. 
Rather, the terms of the letter are conditional and focus on 
aspects of an attorney-client relationship in the event that Gold 
Standard initiated litigation. 
CONCLUSION 
As this Court will see by virtue of its in camera 
inspection, the ruling of the Third Digtrict Court that the 
June 11, 1985 letter was protected under the attorney-client and 
work product privileges was well founded. For the reasons set 
forth above, respondents Barrick/Getty respectfully request that 
this Court affirm the district court's Order denying Gold 
Standard's Motion to Compel. 
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